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Essay
THE CASE FOR FEDERAL MINIMUM CORPORATE
LAW STANDARDS
JOEL SELIGMAN*
The last decade was interesting to corporate legal.scholars due
to the increased sophistication of theories that tended to suggest the
superfluity of regulatory norms. These theories, typified by notions
of "agency costs" or "nexus of contracts," suggested that a combi-
nation of reliance on market forces-such as product, capital, and
control-monitoring devices-such as the board of directors or
outside auditors-and bonding techniques-implicit contracts be-
tween corporate managers and shareholders restricting, for exam-
ple, forms and levels of remuneration-were likely to lead to the
most efficient restrictions on corporate officers; and that, in any
event, problems with this allocation were merely inevitable "agency
costs."' Taken to their logical conclusion, these theories attempt to
justify a purely contractual approach to corporate law; in the vernac-
ular, managers and shareholders should be permitted to "opt out"
of limitations on their freedom of action.2
* Professor, The University of Michigan Law School. B.A., University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles, 1971; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1974. This Essay is an expansion of
remarks delivered as the 1990 Sobeloff Lecture at the University of Maryland School of
Law on April 17, 1990. I wish to express my gratitude to Alfred Conard and Harvey
Goldschmid for their comments on a draft of this Essay.
1. See, e.g., Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980) (economic analysis suggests wage revision process results in ex post settling up
by managers which resolves managerial incentive problems); Jensen & Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305
(1976) (economic analysis of agency costs of equity and debt ownership and determina-
tion of optimal debt/equity ratio); Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1395 (1989) (symposium presenting arguments for and against deregulation based upon
contract theory); cf. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (arguing that private bargaining in the context of con-
tractual or agency relationships between investors and managers is not sufficient to re-
strain management shirking and self-dealing).
2. See Bebchuk, Forward, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1396-99 (1989) (introducing "The Freedom-To-Opt-Out Chal-
lenge to Corporate Law Theory"); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) ("The corporation is a complex set of explicit and
implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants to select the optimal ar-
rangement for the many sets of risks and opportunities that are available in a large
economy.").
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Underlying these theories is the recognition popularized by
Berle and Means that there is a "divergence of interest between
ownership and control" between corporate investors (the "own-
ers") and corporate managers (those in "control").- To Berle and
Means and subsequent corporate reformers,4 this conflict suggested
the need for legal restrictions to prevent corporate managers from
engaging in indolent or self-interested conduct.5 It was assumed
that corporate managers saw their personal interest in terms of the
consumption of corporate salaries, perquisites, and opportunities;
legal norms had to be imposed to redirect managerial behavior to-
wards the goal of profit maximization, that is, the interest of the
outside investors.6
The critical theorists see matters quite differently. They urge,
in effect, that the divergence of interests between corporate owners
and managers is well known to both parties.7 The rational corpo-
rate manager, therefore, will seek to reassure the outside investors
that they will not exploit this conflict to justify a higher stock price
or lower interest costs." They further urge that above and beyond
the effect of whatever monitoring or bonding techniques the corpo-
rate managers might adopt, market forces represent another power7
ful type of limitation on managerial shirking or cupidity.9
There are logical problems with the nexus of contracts and
agency costs analyses. To suggest that shareholders consent to giv-
ing corporate managers broad discretion through a "contract" is er-
roneous on several counts. First, there is no formal written contract
to that effect between common shareholders and managers, no ne-
gotiating process, no volition on the part of the shareholders to
such a contract, nor consent to it. o Second, modem investment
theory, particularly "portfolio" theory, posits that investors can di-
3. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-
20 (1932).
4. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law. Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974).
5. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 3, at 345-57; R. NADER, M. GREEN &J. SELIG-
MAN, supra note 4, at 62-71; Cary, supra note 4, at 696-703.
6. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 3, at 345-46; R. NADER, M. GREEN & J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 114-18.
7. See, e.g., Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1263
(1982).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Fama, supra note 1, at 296-97; Fischel, supra note 7, at 1262-65.
10. Even Easterbrook and Fischel concede that this initial argument is "simple" to
make. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1416.
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versify away virtually all firm-specific risk." The investor's primary
risk is market specific because a portfolio of securities is sensitive to
general market movements, the so-called "Beta" of the portfolio.
To the extent that portfolio theory is adopted by major investors, it
eliminates any incentive to negotiate a contract with managers.
Third, it is reasonable to assume that most shareholders would view
federal securities fraud and state corporate law derivative actions-
rather than a hypothetical contract-as their basic protection against
managerial misconduct. Although votaries of the nexus-of-contract
and agency-costs theories on occasion concede that "legal rules can
operate to reduce agency costs,' 2 they inevitably oppose expansion
of legal protections, typically urging that market forces will address
the matter more efficiently. In this sense, the agency costs theory
can be criticized on a fourth ground: its indeterminance. Once it is
conceded that market forces are imperfect under certain circum-
stances, such as takeover contests in which managerial conflicts of
interest are particularly acute, the analytical utility of both the
nexus-of-contract and the agency-costs theories is significantly
eroded. '3
This Essay advances a different type of claim. The most distinc-
tive aspect of the last decade in corporate law was the celerity with
which traditional constraints on corporate managers weakened. Re-
gardless whether these constraints are characterized as market
forces, monitoring techniques, or accountability mechanisms, these
constraints collectively have been reduced. This Essay will explore the
deterioration in three principle mechanisms of monitoring corpo-
rate behavior: the electoral system, the takeover contest, and share-
holder litigation. The simultaneous erosion of each of these
accountability mechanisms significantly strengthens the case for
some form of minimalist federal corporate law. A sketch of what
this law might entail is presented in the conclusion.
I. CORPORATE- SUFFRAGE
The most important recent event in corporate suffrage was the
1988 adoption by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
of rule 19c-4 authorizing all new corporate issuers to have disparate
11. See, e.g., W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 130 (1970); Fama,
supra note 1, at 291.
12. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 1264.
13. For an earlier, more detailed recitation of these problems, see Seligman, A Sheep
in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Proect, 55
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 348-50 (1987).
949
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voting rights schemes and permitting, under limited circumstances,
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) also to
have classes of common stock with unequal voting rights.' 4 The
adoption of this Rule ended what had been the norm on the NYSE
since 1926 that all listed corporations were required to have com-
mon stock with equal voting rights.' 5
The practical consequences of rule 19c-4 for those corporations
eligible to adopt disparate voting schemes are three-fold. First, use
of the hostile takeover as a device to "monitor" corporate managers
is eliminated. Dual class capitalization has the potential to be the
most successful takeover defense; this potential has not yet been
fully realized.' 6 In a typical dual class capitalization, insiders receive
common stock with multiple votes per share; public stockholders re-
ceive shares with only one vote per share.' 7 Dual class capitalization
thus permits the insiders to control a majority of the votes of a cor-
poration while owning a small minority of its stock. With a majority
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1989). Subsection (d) provides that:
[T]he following, standing alone, shall be presumed not to have the effect of
nullifying, restricting, or disparately reducing the per share voting rights of
holders of an outstanding class or classes of common stock:
(1) The issuance of securities pursuant to an initial registered public
offering;
(2) The issuance of any class of securities, through a registered public
offering, with voting rights not greater than the per share voting rights of
any outstanding class of the common stock of the issuer;
(3) The issuance of any class of securities to effect a bona fide merger
or acquisition, with voting rights not greater than the per share voting
rights of any outstanding class of the common stock of the issuer;
(4) Corporate action taken pursuant to state law requiring a state's
domestic corporation to condition the voting rights of a beneficial or rec-
ord holder of a specified threshold percentage of the corporation's voting
stock on the approval of the corporation's independent shareholders.
Id. § 240.19c-4(d).
The Business Roundtable has challenged the authority of the SEC to adopt rule
19c-4. Business Roundtable v. SEC, No. 88-1651 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (petition for review).
As this goes to press the case has been argued but no decision has been announced. If
the court did not hold that the SEC lacked authority to adopt rule 19c-4, this result
initially would have little consequence. The New York Stock Exchange separately has
adopted the substance of rule 19c-4 as listing standards of that Exchange. The court
result would only address the Rule, not the Exchange's listing standards. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 27,554, 45 SEC Docket (CCH) 159 (1989).
15. See 4 L. Loss &J. SELIGMAN, SECURrTEs REGULATION 1833-54 (1990), and cita-
tions therein; see also Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Com-
mon Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986).
16. See Baxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1671, 1713-15 (1985).
17. See Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA.
L. REV. 807, 812-13 & n.12 (1987); Gordon, Ties That Bond. Dual Class Common Stock and
the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40-42 (1988).
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of votes in hands of the insiders, their corporation will not be a hos-
tile takeover target.
Second, the existence of an independent board of directors to
"monitor" corporate managers is eliminated. The board of direc-
tors' ability to act independently is reduced when managers are
vested with statistical control of a firm. Whatever the limitations of
a board when managers have a minority of the corporate stock, a
board that knows the managers it monitors can cause dismissal of
directors either immediately, or at the next election, will have less
ability to criticize or alter management policies.
Third, the outside shareholder vote as a limitation on corporate
managers is eliminated. Before rule, 19c-4, managers of NYSE cor-
porations were required to submit proposals for fundamental action
(such as mergers and corporate charter amendments) normally
without the statistical certainty of shareholder approval. Although
corporate managers were highly successful in winning board ap-
proval of fundamental elections, even when they did not own a ma-
jority of voting stock, their lack of statistical control influenced both
their behavior and the behavior of outside directors. The lack of
managerial statistical control of corporate stock offered the direc-
tors a greater opportunity to behave independently than if the man-
agers possessed statistical control of the firm. Similarly, the lack of
statistical control influenced managerial submission of proposals for
action. Managers felt a greater incentive to shape these proposals
for action to comply with the preferences of outside shareholders.
In part, one may assume, because of the SEC's concern about
the dissipation of these monitoring devices, rule 19c-4 presump-
tively prohibits disparate voting rights schemes for an outstanding
class of common stock when this is accomplished through ex-
changes of new stock (normally with higher dividends) for outstand-
ing stock or through the payment of new stock with lower voting
rights in the form of a dividend on outstanding stock.'" At the same
time, the Rule does not prohibit disparate voting schemes that can
be accomplished by new corporations when they make initial public
offerings of stock' 9 or by established firms when they engage in a
two-step transaction, first by buying back outstanding shares, then
issuing new stock with diminished voting rights.2 0
If the SEC focused on improving monitoring or accountability
18. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(c)(3)-(4) (1989).
19. See id. § 240.19c-4(d)(1).
20. See Voting Rights Listing Standards-Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act
Release No. 25,891, 41 SEC Docket (CCH) 432, 452 (July 7, 1988).
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devices, it instead would adopt new rules that tend to increase the
independence of the board of directors. Specifically, the SEC might
consider rescinding rule 14a-8(c)(8) which prohibits outside share-
holders from circulating at the corporation's expense proposals to
nominate members of the board of directors. 2' This Rule initially
was adopted in 1942 when it was rare for hostile control contests to
succeed.22 1 We now live in an age of takeover contests. From a cor-
porate governance standpoint, proxy contests for control and
tender offers for control are substitutes for each other. Each seeks
the same result. The regulation of the two devices at the federal
level, however, tends to frustrate use of the proxy contest and tends
to stimulate use of the tender offer.
In the tender offer area, federal regulation through the Wil-
liams Act 25 is based, in theory, on a .policy to avoid "tipping the
balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of
the person making the takeover bid."'24 If the same policy goal was
applied to proxy contests for control, at least three steps might be
explored to achieve more "neutral" regulation.
First, state corporate law currently allows the incumbent direc-
tors of a corporation to employ corporate funds to pay for the costs
of re-election to the board while requiring an outside opponent to
spend its own funds to field a slate of candidates with the possibility
of reimbursement only if the opponent prevails.25 Corporate elec-
toral expenses in a contested election can be substantial, involving,
among other things, the costs of writing, printing, and distributing
multiple sets of proxy materials; hiring proxy solicitors to telephone
shareholders; sometimes newspaper or other mass media advertise-
ments; and entertainment and transportation expenditures. 26 Fed-
eral law does not address this funding question. There is little
question, however, that for many persons seeking control of a cor-
poration this funding rule militates in favor of the tender offer. An
unsuccessful tender offeror still owns stock which might or might
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1989).
22. See 4 L. Loss &J. SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 1998 n. 196. See generally id. at 1998-
2052 (discussing various provisions of Rule 14a-(8)).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988) (originally enacted as Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454; amended by Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567,
§§ 1-2, 84 Stat. 1497).
24. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813; Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975).
25. See 4 L. Loss &J. SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 1922-32.
26. For data on uncontested and contested proxy expenses, see Seligman, The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and Corporate Democracy, 3 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1978).
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not be resold at a profit. An unsuccessful proxy contestant for con-
trol, however, has lost his or her investment.
There have been recurrent proposals over the years to permit
shareholders to nominate directors in the registrant's proxy state-
ment."' The SEC staff's 1980 report on corporate accountability
viewed the issue of shareholder nominations in the registrant's
proxy materials as involving a conflict between two policy objec-
tives: "A shareholder nomination rule is aimed at facilitating share-
holder communications and strengthening shareholder control over
the board of directors and management. On the other hand, there
is a danger that it will encourage the harassment of management
and the waste of corporate assets and render issuers' proxy state-
ments unintelligible."2 The "dangers" cited by the SEC's 1980
staff report could be addressed by placing practical limits on access
to the registrant's proxy materials for the purposes of nominating
opposition candidates to the board. The proposed Tender Offer
Reform Act of 1987, for example, would have given owners of either
3% or more of a company's voting securities, or $500,000 worth of
such securities, the right, at the registrant's expense, to include their
own proxy materials and board candidates in the registrant's proxy
statement.
29
While there is no brief for the formula employed in the 1987
legislative proposal, it does seem reasonably clear that mechanisms
could be designed to avoid the type of problems that concerned the
SEC staff. The SEC demonstrated by rule 14a-8(c)(12) its ability to
27. A proposal to permit shareholder nominations to be made in management's
proxy statement was circulated for comment in connection with the 1942 revision of the
rules, but was abandoned as impracticable. See Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy
Rules, Hearings Before House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 1493, H.R.
1821, & H.R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19, 34-43 (1943). For an interesting sug-
gestion in this regard, see Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The
Lawyer's Role, 37 VA. L. REV. 653, 682-86 (1951) (proposing for reasons of practicality
and continuity a provision by which shareholders would have the right to make nomina-
tions in management's proxy for a bare majority or perhaps only a minority of the board
of directors). See also Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corpo-
rate Suffrage, 39 VA. L. REV. 141 (1953); Seligman, supra note 26; Note, A Proposal for the
Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Director in the Corporate Proxy Statement, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 1139 (1974).
28. See SEC, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: A RE-EXAMINATION OF
RULES RELATING TO SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS, SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN
THE CORPORATE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY, SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING, Hous. & URBAN AFFAIRS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 98-127 (Comm. Print
1980).
29. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1987). For an alternative approach, see
Seligman, supra note 26, at 13-20.
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limit shareholder access to the registrant's proxy for other kinds of
shareholder proposals.3 ° Unless the SEC is willing to design some
mechanism for corporate funding of rival sides in serious proxy con-
tests, the proxy contest will remain a second best alternative to the
tender offer.
Design of a shareholder nomination formula alone, however,
would not necessarily be sufficient to achieve a "neutral" regimen.
The question of confidential voting also should be considered. In
1986, institutional investors held approximately 42.7 percent of to-
tal equities on the NYSE."' Managers of institutional investors
often refrain from voting against incumbent management because
corporate managers will know of their vote and might eliminate
their access to corporate information.3 2 A system ensuring a confi-
dential ballot might tend to alleviate the latter concern and might
encourage institutions to take a more active role in shareholder
elections.
Due to the hostility concerning certain takeover defenses, some
institutional investors have increasingly evidenced a willingness to
take a more activist role on certain shareholder proposals for action.
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) compiles data
on shareholder proposals. In the first half of 1988, 153 corporate
governance resolutions were voted on by stockholders in the 1170
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1989). The Rule provides that when a proposal
deals with "substantially the same subject matter" as a prior proposal submitted by
proxy during the preceding five years, management may omit the proposal from proxies
for three calendar years following its latest submission provided that it received only a
very small percentage of votes cast in a previous meeting or meetings. Id.
31. C. Brancato & P. Gaughan, The Growth of Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital
Markets ii (Colum. U. Sch. L. Inst. Investor Project Nov. 1988) (unpublished
manuscript).
32. In 1987, the Investor Responsibility Research Center proposed a confidential
ballot with only the proxy tabulator and the inspector of elections knowing the identity
of shareholders voting by proxy. "The purposes of confidential voting are to protect the
privacy of shareholders, to deny management the considerable advantage of knowing
before a vote is officially tallied how shareholders have voted, and to minimize pressures
on shareholders who are vulnerable to management pressures." J. HEARD & H. SHER-
MAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM 58 (1987). With respect to
the last point, the report quoted Kurt Wulff, a former stock analyst, who wrote:
The major flaw in the voting process is that management knows how each
shareholder votes. As a result, employees are loath to vote against their superi-
ors. Investment analysts may not wish to offend management because it might
affect their access to information. Fiduciaries, like banks, insurance companies
and pension fund managers, must consider their flow of business from
corporations.
Id. at 61. The report identified 11 companies, including AT&T, Exxon, General Motors,
and IBM, that currently use some type of confidential system to tabulate proxy votes. Id.
at 58-59.
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companies followed by the IRRC. 3 In a few instances, the resolu-
tions gained majority votes. The 1988 report stated:
Proposals to redeem poison pills or submit them to a
shareholder vote were approved by 61.2 percent of the
shares voted at Santa Fe Southern Pacific and by 51.9 per-
cent at USAir Group. And an antigreenmail shareholder
proposal at Gillette won with the support of more than 55
percent of the shares voted.3 4
The IRRC added, "The striking thing about antitakeover provisions
this [1988] proxy season was that there were more shareholder pro-
posals to repeal them than there were management proposals to
adopt them."'3
5
Whether confidential voting would encourage institutions to
take a similar role in control contests is an open question. Many
institutional investor managers may consider suffrage irrelevant to
the type of investment analysis that they are accustomed to doing.
Others may be skeptical that even a "confidential" voting system
would leave management with much doubt about who voted against
them. Still others may have concerns about liability as "controlling
persons" if they perform any activist role in control contests.
Professor Conard has suggested a considerably broader ap-
proach. In a recent article,3 6 he urged that before institutional in-
vestors are likely to perform a meaningful role in corporate
governance, a number of current rules and practices might have to
be altered. Notably, he emphasized that institutional investors
would need to be freed from the threat of control person liability
when they join forces to elect directors who might supervise the
management of corporations. 7
This is not a step that should be taken lightly, if at all. To allow
institutional investors a place in the boardroom with extraordinary
access to nonpublic material information raises troublesome ques-
tions. Nonetheless, Conard is correct that if the current trend to-
wards more activist institutional investors continues, this is the type
of ultimate question that the SEC will have to address.
33. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE BuLL. 93
(1988) [hereinafter IRRC].
34. Id; see also Proxy Rules-Amendments with Regard to Rule 14a-8, Shareholder
Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 25,217, 38 SEC Docket (CCH) 1071, 1076 n.35
(Jan. 6, 1988).
35. IRRC, supra note 33, at 93.
36. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117
(1988).
37. Id. at 177.
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The combination of the growth of the tender offer as a signifi-
cant device for shifting control of the business enterprise and the
growth of the institutional investor as a potentially pivotal actor in
corporate governance indeed suggests that a SEC review of restric-
tions on director nominations in its shareholder proposal rules is
now overdue. What is most troublesome about the SEC's near si-
multaneous adoption of rule 19c-4 and its inaction on shareholder
director nominations is that these actions frustrate two of the most
significant forces to monitor corporate insiders. This is particularly
significant given that the state tender offer statutes make little effort
to camouflage their pro-incumbent manager bias.38
II. THE TAKEOVER CONTEST
In the past two decades, the most significant new "real world"
limitation on corporate managers has been the increased use of the
hostile takeover. To many critical of government regulation of the
corporation, the takeover has been championed as a pivotal discipli-
nary device replacing inefficient managers with more efficient
ones. 9 The last few years, however, have seen a diminution of the
efficacy of this disciplinarian device primarily because of decisions
upholding the constitutionality of state tender offer statutes.
While the first state tender offer statute was adopted in March
1968,40 the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.4'
seemed to mark a death knell for this genre of statute. MITE re-
viewed the Illinois Business Take-Over Act. 2 Under the Act, any
takeover offer had to be registered with the Illinois Secretary of
State if the target company was a corporation or other issuer of se-
curities of which shareholders located in Illinois owned at least ten
percent of the class of equity securities subject to the offer, or for
which any two of three conditions were met: (1) the corporation
had its principal executive office in Illinois, (2) was organized under
the laws of Illinois, or (3) at least ten percent of its stated capital and
paid-in surplus were within Illinois.43
38. For examples of these statutes, see 5 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at
2282-92.
39. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Respond-
ing to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1169-74 (1981).
40. Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act, ch. 119, 1968 Va. Acts 167 (codified as amended
at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1985) (repealed 1989)).
41. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
42. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, paras. 137.51-137.70 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (repealed
1983).
43. MITE, 457 U.S. at 626-27.
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The Illinois Act provided:
An offer becomes registered 20 days after a registra-
tion statement is filed with the Secretary unless the Secre-
tary calls a hearing.... The Secretary may call a hearing at
any time during the 20-day waiting period to adjudicate the
substantive fairness of the offer if he believes it is necessary
to protect the shareholders of the target company, and a
hearing must be held if requested by a majority of a target
company's outside directors or by Illinois shareholders
who own 10% of the class of securities subject to the of-
fer.... If the Secretary does hold a hearing, he is directed
by the statute to deny registration to a tender offer if he
finds that . . . " . . the take-over offer is inequitable or
would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon the of-
ferees .... "4
MITE was announced by a divided Court. Only Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun joined that part of Justice White's
opinion that concluded that the Illinois Act was pre-empted by Fed-
eral regulation.45 In White's analysis, three provisions of the Illinois
Act "upset the careful balance struck by Congress":46 (1) the twenty
business days' waiting period that applied to the offeror but not to
the target, (2) the hearing provisions, which introduced extended
delay, and (3) the state's passing on the substantive fairness of the
offer.47 It did not follow, however, that the six Justices who did not
join in the pre-emption holding disagreed with it. Only Justice Ste-
vens-with whom Justice Powell agreed generally-went out of his
way to limit his concurring opinion by stating that he was not per-
suaded "that Congress' decision to follow a policy of neutrality in its
own legislation is tantamount to a federal prohibition against state
legislation designed to provide special protection for incumbent
management. ' 48 The other four justices simply did not address the
question-Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist because they
thought the case was moot,49 and Justice O'Connor because she
thought the holding of invalidity under the commerce clause made
44. Id. at 627 (paraphrasing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2. paras, 137.54.E, 137.57.A,
137.57.E (1979)).
45. Id. at 626 n.*.
46. Id. at 634.
47. Id. at 634-40.
48. Id. at 655.





Justice White was able to muster a majority of only five for his
opinion that the Illinois statute violated the commerce clause be-
cause the burden it imposed on interstate commerce through its in-
cidental regulation was "excessive in light of the local interests the
Act purports to further."' There was no majority for the anterior
proposition that the statute "directly regulates transactions which
take place across state lines, even if wholly outside the State of Illi-
nois," 52 and even if the tender offer would not affect a single Illinois
stockholder.55 Nonetheless, after MITE, a number of state statutes
soon fell under MITE's commerce clause or supremacy clause
analysis.'
In 1987, the Supreme Court dramatically shifted direction
when it sustained the Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Act in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.55 The Indiana Act, unless a corpo-
ration "opts out" by amending its articles of incorporation or by-
laws, applies to any corporation incorporated in Indiana that has (1)
at least 100 shareholders; (2) its principal place of business, its prin-
cipal office, or substantial assets in Indiana; and (3) either more than
10 percent of its shareholders resident in Indiana, or more than 10
percent of its shares owned by Indiana residents, or 10,000 resident
shareholders.5 6
The Act focuses on the acquisition of "control shares," an event
that occurs whenever an entity acquires shares that, but for the op-
eration of the Act, would bring it voting power equal to any of 3
thresholds: 20, 33 1/3, or 50 percent.5 7 An entity that acquires
control shares does not acquire voting rights unless a majority vote
of all disinterested shareholders holding each class of stock ap-
proves a resolution
to confer rights on the control shares at the next regularly
scheduled meeting of the shareholders, or at a specially
50. Id. at 655 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
51. Id. at 640.
52. Id. at 641.
53. Id. at 642.
54. See, e.g., L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 209 (6th Cir. 1985)
(supremacy clause); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425, 1431 (10th
Cir. 1983) (commerce clause); Telvest Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 577 (4th Cir.
1983) (same); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 565-68 (6th Cir.
1982) (same); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128-33 (8th Cir.
1982) (supremacy clause).
55. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
56. Id. at 73; see IND. CODE § 23-1-42-4(a) (1989).
57. CTS, 481 U.S. at 73; see IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (1989).
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scheduled meeting. The acquiror can require management
of the corporation to hold such a special meeting within 50
days if it files an "acquiring person statement," requests
the meeting, and agrees to pay the expenses of the meet-
ing .... If the shareholders do not vote to restore voting
rights to the shares, the corporation may redeem the con-
trol shares from the acquiror at fair market value, but it is
not required to do so .... Similarly, if the acquiror does
not file an acquiring person statement with the corpora-
tion, the corporation may, if its bylaws or articles of incor-
poration so provide, redeem the shares at any time after 60
days after the acquiror's last acquisition. 8
Justice Powell, for a majority of six, began by analyzing the In-
diana Act under the supremacy clause. After distinguishing Justice
White's opinion in MITE, Justice Powell addressed what had been
the decisive fact for the Court of Appeals in CTS, the delay in con-
summation of a tender offer until fifty days after its commencement:
As did the Court of Appeals, Dynamics reasons that no ra-
tional offeror will purchase shares until it gains assurance
that those shares will carry voting rights. Because it is pos-
sible that voting rights will not be conferred until a share-
holder meeting 50 days after commencement of the offer,
Dynamics concludes that the Act imposes a 50-day delay.
This, it argues, conflicts with the shorter 20-business-day
period established by the SEC as the minimum period for
which a tender offer may be held open .... We find the
alleged conflict illusory.
Even assuming that the Indiana Act imposes some ad-
ditional delay, nothing in MITE suggested that any delay
imposed by state regulation, however short, would create a
conflict with the Williams Act. The plurality argued only
that the offeror should "be free to go forward without un-
reasonable delay." . . . In that case, the Court was con-
fronted with the potential for indefinite delay and
presented with no persuasive reason why some deadline
could not be established. By contrast, the Indiana Act pro-
vides that full voting rights will be vested-if this eventually
is to occur-within 50 days after commencement of the of-
fer. This period is within the 60-day period Congress es-
tablished for [tender offers in the Williams Act]. We
cannot say that a delay within that congressionally deter-
58. CTS, 481 U.S. at 74-75 (footnote omitted).
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mined period is unreasonable. 59
Powell further noted that the Williams Act "would pre-empt a
variety of state corporate laws of hitherto unquestioned validity if it
were construed to pre-empt any state statute that may limit or delay
the free exercise of power after a successful tender offer" such as
staggered terms for boards of directors or cumulative voting.'
The Powell majority similarly found that the Indiana Act did
not offend the commerce clause:
The principal objects of dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate
commerce.... The Indiana Act is not such a statute. It has
the same effects on tender offers whether or not the offeror
is a domiciliary or resident of Indiana. Thus, it "visits its
effects equally upon both interstate and local business....
The Court of Appeals['] ... decision rested on its view
of the Act's potential to hinder tender offers. We think the
Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance for
Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation
of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose
very existence and attributes are a product of state law....
Every State in this country has enacted laws regulating cor-
porate governance. By prohibiting certain transactions,
and regulating others, such laws necessarily affect certain
aspects of interstate commerce. This necessarily is true
with respect to corporations with shareholders in States
other than the State of incorporation. ...
The Constitution does not require the States to
subscribe to any particular economic theory. We are not
inclined "to second-guess the empirical judgments of
lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation" . ...
Dynamics' argument that the Act is unconstitutional
ultimately rests on its contention that the Act will limit the
number of successful tender offers. There is little evidence
that this will occur. But even if true, this result would not
substantially affect our Commerce Clause analysis. 61
The most significant state law response to CTS has been the
adoption by Delaware and several other states of the moratorium-
59. Id. at 84-85.
60. Id. at 84-87.
61. Id. at 87-92.
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type state tender offer statute earlier enacted by New York. In 1985,
New York adopted legislation to regulate tender offers for New
York corporations by prohibiting any person that buys twenty per-
cent or more of a corporation's stock from "engaging in any busi-
ness combination" with the corporation for five years without the
board's approval before the acquisition of the twenty percent, and
permitting twenty percent purchases after that only with the consent
of a majority of disinterested stockholders or payment of the same
amount to all stockholders in accordance with a statutory formula.62
Few state tender offer statutes more clearly intended to frus-
trate hostile takeovers than did the New York Act. The Ad Hoc
Committee on Corporate Legislation of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York commented in a November 1985 Interim
Report:
The Committee believes that the provisions of the bill
represents a major transfer of rights and power from stock-
holders to the board of directors in place at the time of an
"unfriendly" takeover bid. Proposed section 912 would in
effect give the incumbent board significant power to dis-
courage "unfriendly" tender offers. This could curtail the
opportunity for stockholders to realize a premium over
current market, as generally happens in a hostile takeover
bid.63
Delaware General Corporation Law section 203,' along the
62. Act approved Dec. 16, 1985, ch. 915, 1985 N.Y. Laws 3454, 3458 (codified as
amended at N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 513(e) and 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990)
and amending the Security Takeover Disclosure Act). See generally L. SCHUMANN, STATE
REGULATIONS OF TAKEOVERS AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: THE EFFECTS OF NEW YORK'S
1985 TAKEOVER STATUTES (report of the Bureau of Economics to the Federal Trade
Comm'n, March 1987) (a sample of 94 firms studied experienced approximately a one
percent decline in equity value in response to the announcement of the Governor's bill);
Note, A Policy Analysis of New York State's Security Takeover Disclosure Act, 53 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 1117 (1988); Note, The Constitutionality of State Business Combination Legislation: New
York's Section 912, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 1025 (1987).
63. INTERIM REPORT OF AD HOC COMM. ON CORP. TAKEOVER LEGIS. OF ASS'N OF THE
BAR OF THE CrrY OF N.Y. 5 (Nov. 12, 1985).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988). Regarding the Delaware Act, see
Finkelstein, The New Delaware Takeover Statute, 21 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 47
(1988); Veasey, Finkelstein & Shaughnessy, The Delaware Takeover Law: Some Issues, Strate-
gies and Comparisons, 43 Bus. LAW. 865, 885 (1988) (concluding Delaware statute is mod-
erate and balanced compared with other state statutes); Veasey & Finkelstein, The
Delaware Business Combination Statute: An Opportunity for Reassessment, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 157
(1988) (general description of the operation of the statute and interplay with other take-
over defenses); Comment, The Delaware Debate on Takeover Legislation: No Small Wonder, 93
DICK. L. REV. 339, 354-63 (1989) (describing Delaware's struggle to write an acceptable
law); Note, The Delaware Takeover Statute. Constitutionally Infirm Even Under the Market Par-
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general lines of the New York law, similarly prohibits for three years
"business combinations" between a publicly traded Delaware cor-
poration and an "interested stockholder"65 (in essence, a bidder
with at least 15 percent of the target's shares)," unless: (1) the tar-
get's board earlier approved either the business combination or the
transaction that resulted in the stockholder's becoming an "inter-
ested" holder;6 7 (2) upon consummation of the transaction that re-
sulted in the stockholder's becoming an "interested" holder, the
interested stockholder owned at least 85 percent of the voting stock
(apart from shares owned by (i) persons who are both directors and
officers, and (ii) employee stock plans in which employees do not
have the right to determine confidentially whether to tender or ex-
change shares);6" (3) the business combination is approved on or
after the date the stockholder achieved interested status by 66 2/3
percent of the outstanding voting stock not owned by the interested
stockholder;6 9 (4) the corporation's original certificate of incorpora-
tion expressly elects not to be governed by section 203;70 (5) the
corporation's stockholders elect not to be governed by section
203;7 1 or (6) certain competitive offers to acquire the target are
made with the approval (or not opposed by a majority) of the tar-
get's board.72
The Delaware takeover statute is in certain respects less likely
to impede hostile tender offers than the New York statute. First, it
imposes a three year, rather than a five year, moratorium.73 Second,
unlike the blunderbuss New York statute that prohibits any substantial
sale of assets during the five year period,7 4 the Delaware Act's defi-
nition of business combination covers transactions between the tar-
get and the bidder only during the moratorium period. The Act
permits the target's assets to be sold to unaffiliated parties and the
ticipant Exception, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 203, 230-33 (1988) (concluding that § 203 would
violate the commerce clause and would not be served by market participation doctrine
because Delaware is an "effective monopoly in the sale of corporate charters").
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (Supp. 1988).
66. Id. § 203(c)(5).
67. Id. § 203(a)(1).
68. Id. § 203(a)(2).
69. Id. § 203(a)(3).
70. Id. § 203(b)(1). A corporation's board could also "opt out" during the 90 days
after the effective date of the Section. Id. § 203(b)(2). The Act also excepts certain
inadvertent interested stockholders. Id. § 203(b)(5).
71. Id. § 203(b)(3). Other restrictions apply. Id.
72. Id. § 203(b)(6).
73. Compare id. § 203(a) with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b) (McKinney 1986).
74. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(5)(A) (McKinney 1986).
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proceeds distributed pro rata to its shareholders.7 5 Third, the Dela-
ware Act contains more methods to circumvent the moratorium
than does the New York law. Nonetheless, the Delaware Act's ca-
pacity to deter hostile tender offers is significant, particularly when,
as is permitted in Delaware., a corporation may proceed under the
section 203 shield and also adopt a poison pill.76
It is uncertain whether moratorium statutes of the Delaware
and New York types would survive constitutional review in the
Supreme Court." CTS is, at best, an ambiguous guide. The Powell
majority in CTS was unwilling to hold that the Williams Act pre-
empted the Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Act because (1) the
Act allowed shareholders to collectively evaluate the fairness of an
offer, and hence was consistent with the Williams Act policy of in-
vestor protection;7" (2) the fifty days for the shareholder vote was
within the sixth day maximum period Congress established in sec-
tion 14(d)(5);79 and (3) the Williams Act "would pre-empt a variety
of state corporate laws of hitherto unquestioned validity if it were
construed to pre-empt any state statute that may limit or delay the
free exercise of power after a successful tender offer" 0 such as stag-
gered terms for boards of directors or cumulative voting.8"
In contrast, the New York and Delaware statutes vest existing
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(3) (Supp. 1988).
76. See, e.g., BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 474 (D. Del. 1988) (plaintiff
conceding that poison pill was within authority of target corporation board); see also
CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(concluding that bidder corporation would be unable to establish that poison pill of
target was invalid).
Alternatively, a Delaware corporation may be able to frustrate the ability of a bidder
to "opt out" by acquiring 85% or more of the common stock or by issuing stock blocks
to employee stock plans that have the right to determine confidentially whether to
tender their shares. See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257,
273-74 (Del. Ch. 1989).
77. To date, both Acts have avoided federal district court injunctions. With regard
to New York, see Salant Acquisition Corp. v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 199,
204 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (summary disposition of significant and substantial constitutional
issues inappropriate). Concerning Delaware, see City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership
v. Interco, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1551, 1555-56 (D. Del.) (probable that statute would sur-
vive Supremacy Clause-Williams Act, Commerce Clause and due process attacks), aff'd,
860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F.
Supp. 476, 486-88 (D. Del. 1988) (Supremacy Clause-Williams Act and Commerce
Clause); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 472-73 (D. Del. 1988) (same); Black
& Decker Corp. v. American Standard Inc., 679 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (D. Del. 1988)
(irreparable harm not shown).
78. 481 U.S. 69, 82-83 (1987).
79. Id. at 83-84.




managers with the power to block tender offers, and thus appear to
be inconsistent with the Williams Act purpose of ensuring investor
choice with respect to accepting or rejecting a tender offer and the
more general policy " 'to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bids.' "82
While the fifty days delay in the Indiana statute is within the sixty
day congressional limit,8 3 a moratorium of three or five years obvi-
ously exceeds it. Similarly, the purpose of cumulative voting or
staggered board terms can be stated in terms unrelated to tender
offers, the purpose (or inevitable effect) of a successful moratorium
statute is to deter tender offers.
Nonetheless, there is language in CTS that can be cited to sup-
port the constitutionality of a moratorium statute under the
Supremacy Clause. Judge Easterbrook, reviewing the constitution-
ality of a Wisconsin moratorium act,' for example, has written:
CTS observed that laws affecting the voting power of
acquired shares do not differ in principle from many other
rules governing the internal affairs of corporations. Laws
requiring staggered or classified boards of directors delay
the transfer of control to the bidder; laws requiring super
majority vote for a merger may make a transaction less at-
82. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977) (quoting 113 CONG.
REc. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams)).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988).
84. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 498 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989) described the Wisconsin Act in these terms:
No firm incorporated in Wisconsin and having its headquarters, substantial
operations, or 10% of its shares or shareholders there may "engage in a busi-
ness combination with an interested stockholder... for 3 years after the inter-
ested stockholder's stock acquisition date unless the board of directors of the
[Wisconsin] corporation has approved, before the interested stockholder's
stock acquisition date, that business combination or the purchase of stock",
Wis. Stat. § 180.726(2). An "interested stockholder" is one owning 10% of the
voting stock, directly or through associates (anyone acting in concert with it),
§ 180.726(1)0). A "business combination" is a merger with the bidder or any
of its affiliates, sale of more than 5% of the assets to bidder or affiliate, liquida-
tion of the target, or a transaction by which the target guarantees the bidder's
or affiliates [sic] debts or passes tax benefits to the bidder or affiliate,
§ 180.726(l)(e). The law, in other words, provides for almost hermetic separa-
tion of bidder and target for three years after the bidder obtains 10% of the
stock-unless the target's board consented before then. No matter how popu-
lar the offer, the ban applies: obtaining 85% (even 100%) of the stock held by
non-management shareholders won't allow the bidder to engage in a business
combination, as it would under Delaware law. Wisconsin firms cannot opt out
of the law, as may corporations subject to almost all other state takeover stat-
utes. In Wisconsin it is management's approval in advance, or wait three years.
Id. at 503-04 (citations omitted).
964 [VOL. 49:947
1990] FEDERAL MINIMUM CORPORATE LAW STANDARDS
tractive or impossible. Yet these are not preempted by the
Williams Act, any more than state laws concerning the effect
of investors' votes are preempted by the portions of the
Exchange Act regulating the process of soliciting proxies.
Federal securities laws frequently regulate process while
state corporate law regulates substance. Federal proxy
rules demand that firms disclose many things, in order to
promote informed voting. Yet states may permit or compel
a super majority rule (even an unanimity rule) rendering it
all but impossible for a particular side to prevail in the vot-
ing. Are the state laws therefore preempted? How about
state laws that allow many firms to organize without traded
shares? Universities, hospitals, and other charities have
self-perpetuating boards and cannot be acquired by tender
offer. Insurance companies may be organized as mutuals,
without traded shares; retailers often organize as co-opera-
tives, without traded stock; some decendy large companies
(large enough to be "reporting companies" under the '34
Act) issue stock subject to buy-sell agreements under which
the investors cannot sell to strangers without offering stock
to the firm at a formula price; Ford Motor Co. issued non-
voting stock to outside investors while reserving voting
stock for the family, thus preventing outsiders from gaining
control (dual-class stock is becoming more common); firms
issue and state law enforces poison pills. All of these de-
vices make tender offers unattractive (even impossible) and
greatly diminish the power of proxy fights, success in which
often depends on buying votes by acquiring the equity to
which the vote is attached. None of these devices could be
thought preempted by the Williams Act or the proxy rules.
If they are not preempted, neither is Wis. Stat. § 180.726.85
There are responses to the questions propounded by Judge Easter-
brook. In the circumstances described, universities, hospitals, insur-
ance companies, and cooperatives are not, for example, subject to
the Williams Act, and hence are not subject to pre-emption analysis.
Super-majority or unanimity rules are not employed in board elec-
tions. The buy-sell agreements and the nonvoting stock Judge Eas-
terbrook described were long prohibited by the NYSE-although
Ford Motor Company was clearly given exceptional treatment by
that Exchange. None of these types of responses, however, effec-
tively eliminates the uncertainty about how the Supreme Court will
rule if it reviews a moratorium statute under the Supremacy Clause.
85. Id. (citations omitted).
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Ultimately, the question becomes whether Congress should ad-
dress laws that may be both "economic folly and constitutional." 6
The moratorium statutes strongly tilt in favor of incumbent manage-
ment and jeopardize what former SEC Chairman Ruder has termed
"the free transferability of securities."8" The Supreme Court major-
ity in CTS took some pains to emphasize that it was not engaged in
an economic or cost-benefit analysis concerning the Indiana Act.88
It is nonetheless readily apparent that states favor takeover statutes
as a means to protect local industry and local jobs. No state claims
when it adopts a tender offer statute that it has empirical evidence
that the legislation is best for a national economy. This is precisely
the issue Congress should address. Given the magnitude of target
shareholder premiums that state moratorium statutes may block,
and the likelihood that this money would be recirculated back into
the economy, there is a real possibility that the more significant state
laws do more harm than good. At the very least, the moratorium
statutes may significantly tilt the balance in favor of target manage-
ment. At the worst, the belief among state legislatures that "any-
thing goes" will inspire a "race to the bottom." States will compete
to design the most pro-incumbent management statutes as a device
to attract or retain incorporations. The price of federalism can be
too high. With the moratorium statutes, the states appear to have
crossed that line. If the acts are not unconstitutional, then Congress
should consider whether they should be pre-empted by a better bal-
anced federal regime.
III. SHAREHOLDER LITGATION
At least until 1976, any shareholder of a corporation had the
right to maintain a derivative action against a majority or more of a
board of directors to prove a violation by the board of a duty of care
(negligence); 9 a duty of loyalty (exploitation of a conflict of inter-
est); 90 or waste (payment by a board so large that it amounted to a
gift).9" In theory, the shareholder's right derived from the corpora-
86. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 97 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
87. Ruder, Federal Preemption of State Anti-takeover Legislation, U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission News Release, Oct. 7, 1987, at 5 (remarks before the 26th Annual
Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago, Ill.).
88. 481 U.S. at 92.
89. See, e.g., H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 234, 242 (3d ed.
1983).
90. See Seligman, supra note 13, at 367-72.
91. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933).
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92tion and any recovery went directly to the corporate treasury. 9
While often controversial, the derivative action generally was re-
garded as a useful device to ensure minimal levels of law compliance
by the corporate board.93
Then in 1976, in the federal district court decision Gall v. Exxon
Corp.,94 the technique of a board appointed special litigation com-
mittee was first used in an action against a majority or more of a
board. Today, the special litigation committee technique is gener-
ally employed when demand on the board of directors is "futile"
(that is, a majority or more of the board is properly named in a
suit)." A committee normally will hire outside litigation counsel to
prepare a factual report providing the context for the committee's
evaluation of whether an action should be maintained. 96 The law
has consistently prohibited board members properly named in a
plaintiff's demand from serving on the committee.9 7 The commit-
tees almost invariably have recommended that the lawsuit should
not be continued.98
This poses a pivotal legal question for the courts: How should
they evaluate a committee recommendation? Three cognate ap-
proaches have evolved.
At one extreme is the view of the New York Court of Appeals
(that state's highest court) which in 1979 held that if the members of
a board committee are disinterested and if the committee follows
appropriate procedures, a court should defer to the business judg-
ment of the committee and not examine the substantive merits of its
decision.99 This approach, in effect, is premised on the belief that a
special litigation committee evaluating the wisdom of a lawsuit
against fellow directors can proceed with the same intellectual disin-
terestedness and detachment that the entire board could in deciding
whether to make a conventional business decision, such as whether
to build a new plant.
92. For a discussion of the origin and development of derivative actions, see H.
HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 89, § 358.
93. See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a
Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981).
94. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
95. H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 89, § 365.
96. See Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of
Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DuKE L.J. 959, 970-71.
97. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001, 417 N.Y.S.2d
920, 927 (1979) ("business judgment rule does not foreclose inquiry by courts into the
disinterested independence of those members of the board chosen by it..
98. Cox, supra note 96, at 962-63.
99. Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 623-24, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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At the other extreme was the view of Duke University School of
Law ProfessorJames Cox that the "structural bias" of a board com-
mittee made it inappropriate for such a committee to recommend
dismissal of a lawsuit brought against other members of the board.
Cox observed:
Commentators have explained in detail why the spdcial
litigation committee's independence may be more appar-
ent than real. Their concern is founded on the observation
that the defendants and the members of the special litiga-
tion committee share a common cultural bond: director-
ship of a public corporation. The natural empathy and
collegiality that this bond engenders makes an adverse
judgment of a colleague's behavior distasteful at best.
Also, when the committee is formed after the instigation of
the derivative suit, the situation is rife with opportunities
for the defendants to select for committee membership
those directors most sympathetic to their position. The
committee's independence may be further undermined by
its members' desire to curry favor with their fellow direc-
tors or with the business community in general. Finally,
special litigation committees operate under the constant
threat of dissolution should they displease the board by
pursuing the plaintiff's cause with excessive zeal.
The likelihood that these factors will corrupt the com-
mittee's independent judgment will be referred to as
"structural bias." Whatever one's view about the impact of
the factors that feed a committee's structural bias, the com-
mittee's record is itself disquieting: although there have
been more than a score of special litigation committee
cases to date, in all but one the committee concluded that
the suit in question was not in the corporation's best
interest. 100
The "structural bias" theory received judicial approval in Iowa and,
briefly, in North Carolina, where courts refused to permit directors
who are parties to a derivative action to appoint an "independent"
committee for the purpose of recommending dismissal of a deriva-
100. Cox, supra note 96, at 962-63. Professor Cox amplified this argument in two
subsequent articles. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Deriv-
ative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984); Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83. But cf. Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance:
An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 793 & n.7
(1984) (agreeing with Cox's general concerns about structural bias, but asserting that
special committees help foster internal reform).
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tive lawsuit. 101
The most influential approach is an intermediate one adopted
in 1981 by the Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado. 0 2 The court, mindful that" 'there but for the grace of God go
I' empathy" ' ' 3 might influence directors on a litigation committee,
established a two-part test. First, the trial court, when reviewing a
board committee recommendation to dismiss a derivative action,
should "inquire into the independence and good faith of the com-
mittee and the bases supporting its conclusions."" Second, the
court must apply its own independent business judgment-and not
defer to the business judgment of the board committee-to deter-
mine whether the action should be dismissed. The Zapata court
stated:
This means, of course, that instances could arise where a
committee can establish its independence and sound bases
for its good faith decisions and still have the corporation's
motion denied. The second step is intended to thwart in-
stances where corporate actions meet the criteria of step
one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or
where corporate actions would simply prematurely termi-
nate a stockholder grievance deserving of further consider-
ation in the corporation's interest.'0 5
The apparent liberality of the Zapata test was somewhat watered
down by the Delaware Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ar-
onson v. Lewis." 6 There a stockholder challenged as a waste of cor-
porate assets an employment contract between Meyers Parking
System and an individual who owned forty-seven percent of Meyers
stock who was alleged to have personally selected each director of
Meyers." 7 The Delaware Supreme Court directed that the action
be dismissed because the plaintiff had neither made demand on the
board nor alleged facts with sufficient particularity indicating why
the Meyers directors were tainted by self-interest.' 0 8
101. See Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983);
see also Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 324 S.E.2d 878 (1985), rev'd, 318 N.C. 289,
349 S.E.2d 41 (1986), withdrawn, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323, modified and aff'd on
rehearing, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987).
102. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
103. Id. at 787.
104. Id. at 788.
105. Id. at 789.
106. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
107. Id. at 809.
108. Id. at 818.
969
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Aronson, in effect, confirmed the bifurcation of derivative litiga-
tion procedure in Delaware. On the one hand, unless a plaintiff can
allege with sufficient particularity facts that demonstrate the self-in-
terest of a majority of a board, the board may treat dismissal of a
derivative litigation much as it does any other "business" deci-
sion. 109 In these director "demand" cases, the board need not hire
outside litigation counsel, need not prepare a written report, and
except in extraordinary circumstances, a court normally will follow
its recommendation to dismiss a derivative suit." ° For one notable
example, in 1987 a Delaware Chancery Court approved General
Motors' (GM) $742 million buyback of H. Ross Perot's GM stock
without examining the merits of the plaintiffs' claim because the
court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to show that the GM direc-
tors were interested or not independent."' This decision was made
despite evidence reported in the decision itself that Perot, the recip-
ient, had presented a contract he considered "unbelievable,"
"something that the Board will never approve."' 1 2 One set of com-
mentators, perceptively noting the "profound" implications of this
type of decision, stated:
It would appear that, under the court's formulation, de-
mand will not be excused (and hence the litigation may not
be able to continue) if a self-dealing transaction has been
approved by a disinterested board even if, on the merits of
the case, the interested director would not get the benefit
of the business judgment rule. 313
On the other hand, in Delaware, if "demand futility" is demon-
strated by a plaintiff alleging sufficiently particularized facts to
demonstrate that a majority of the board is not adequately in-
dependent, the case can still be dismissed without a trial on the mer-
its, if the defendants appoint a special litigation committee and
otherwise comply with the Zapata procedures.
None of the approaches to dismissal of shareholder litigation-
not even that in New York-can prevent a shareholder from litigat-
ing a fraud action based on federal securities law claims such as rule
109. See, e.g., id.
110. See id.
111. Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914 (Del. Ch. 1987), affd, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988).
112. Id. at 919.
113. L. SOLOMON, D. SciwARiz &J. BAUMAN, CORPORA71ONS: LAW AND Poticy 854
(2d ed. 1988). For a discussion on the business judgment rule, see id. at 622-78.
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lOb-5. l" 4 When, however, a plaintiff has no federal fraud claim,
both the New York and Delaware approaches pose serious obstacles
to the litigation of meritorious actions. Both acts can substantially
delay the right to appear in court and try the merits.'"5 Both may
prevent a plaintiff with a meritorious claim from litigating at all.
While one may share the concern that the absence of a special litiga-
tion committee approach might stimulate the filing of nonmeritori-
ous claims, there have long been judicial devices to dismiss
nonmeritorious claims such as the motion for summary judgment or
motion to dismiss' 16 and now, at least in federal courts, there is con-
siderable willingness to sanction attorneys who file nonmeritorious
suits. 117
The broader significance of the rise of the special litigation
committee technique for dismissing shareholder litigation becomes
clearer when it is recognized that this device has become a common
feature of shareholder litigation simultaneous with the erosion of
shareholder suffrage suggested by rule 19c-4 and the decline of the
tender offer, in part, prompted by state tender offer moratorium
statutes. This means that each of the three principal restraints on
corporate managers has simultaneously weakened. This weakening,
however, does not give corporate managers carte blanche. They are
still subject to the restraints of product and capital markets and fed-
eral securities law. It does mean that the aggregate of "monitoring"
devices is not as secure as it was two decades ago.
IV. FEDERAL MINIMUM CORPORATE LAW STANDARDS
More than fifteen years ago, former SEC Chairman, then Co-
lumbia Law School Professor William Cary, troubled by Delaware's
role in the deterioration of state corporate law standards, proposed
a Federal Corporate Uniformity Act."' The essence of Cary's pro-
posal is that Congress should pre-empt state corporate law norms
only when a compelling need for a limited intervention can be
shown. This limited type'1 9 of approach is appropriate in a country
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989); see, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977).
115. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 511-12 (Del. Ch. 1984) (suggesting that
the Zapata procedure sidetracks derivative litigation for at least two years), aft'd, 499
A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985).
116. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12, 56.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
118. Gary, supra note 4, at 696-705.
119. Cf R. NADER, N. GREEN &J. SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 240-42 (proposal for dual
federal-state chartering and regulation of large corporations).
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with our long tradition of state corporate law standards. Nonethe-
less, sufficient evidence has accumulated to justify congressional ex-
amination of three areas for possible federal pre-emption.
First, Congress should consider adopting a one common share,
one vote norm for all corporations subject to SECjurisdiction under
section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.120 This would
prohibit the largest corporations from adopting or maintaining a
disparate voting scheme as a takeover defense or for any other rea-
son. Elsewhere, I have urged that the prohibition of disparate vot-
ing is authorized by section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 which has as its purpose "the free exercise of the voting rights
of stockholders."' 2' Congressional enactment of a one common
share, one vote rule, in a narrow sense, would be a modest achieve-
ment. It would merely restore the NYSE standard that operated be-
tween 1926 and 1987 on which the federal securities laws were
premised. More significantly, restoration of the one common share,
one vote standard is essential to ensure the efficacy of three pivotal
types of corporate accountability mechanisms: the tender offer, the
independent board of directors, and outside shareholder review of
fundamental corporate transactions. 22  The difficult issue is
whether Congress should go further than merely restoring the one
common share, one vote standard, and also enact a federal standard
giving outside shareholders some opportunity, at corporate ex-
pense, to nominate corporate directors. There is a strong case for
SEC consideration of such a rule.' 21 One advantage of new con-
gressional enabling legislation would be to remove questions of the
SEC's power to act.
If Congress were to address this area, it should take a limited
approach. Congressional legislation should be confined to the sin-
gle question of shareholder power in the corporate proxy to nomi-
nate directors. It should not extend afield to other questions
concerning the board such as who may be a director or whether
there should be a board staff. On these questions the case for fed-
eral legislation is weaker.
Second, limited federal pre-emption of state tender offer stat-
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (1988). For discussion of § 12, see 4 L. Loss &J. SELIGMAN,
supra note 15, at 1733-73.
121. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14(a), Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat.
881, 895 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1988)); see Seligman, supra
note 15, at 717 (quotingJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964)); id. at 717-19.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 22-37.
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utes should be used to prohibit the moratorium and kindred state
statutes that significantly tilt the odds against shareholders receiving
a tender offer. There is no need to pre-empt more restricted state
statutes like the Indiana Act that was upheld as constitutional in the
CTS decision.' 24 These laws do not seriously threaten the use of the
tender offer as a monitoring device. Drafting a law to pre-empt the
blunderbuss acts, like New York, should not be particularly difficult.
By analogy to the Securities Act of 1933, what might be designed
would be a broad prohibitory act with a long series of specific excep-
tions and a residual authority to make further exceptions vested in
the SEC. 2 ' The more important point is that the increased state
enthusiasm for legislation explicitly designed to prevent tender of-
fers for local firms threatens to Balkanize the national economy. No
one could seriously suggest that the nation's shareholders favor a
system of laws that has as its object the deprivation of premia aver-
aging approximately fifty percent above market value. 126 Tender of-
fers that risk doing competitive injury to our economy obviously
should not be favored; that is why we have federal antitrust laws.
The most troublesome aspect of the current state rush to adopt ever
more restrictive state tender offer statutes is that there is little doubt
that no one at the state level is seriously considering whether these
laws are good for the country as a whole. It is for expressly this
reason that congressional attention is urgently needed.
Third, Congress should enact a federal cause of action based on
existing state corporate law fiduciary standards such as the duty of
care, the duty of loyalty, and the waste doctrine. This cause of ac-
tion would be litigated in federal court and would expressly prohibit
federal courts from deferring to special litigation committees in
suits properly alleging the misconduct of any member of the board
of directors. The fiduciary standards applied by federal courts
would remain state corporate law. This arrangement would pre-
serve for business corporations their current opportunity to choose
a state of incorporation, based in part on an evaluation of these
standards. The new federal rule would be procedural. It would
substitute for the special litigation committee the well-established
federal courts' standards for dismissal of nonmeritorious suits. 127 It
124. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
125. For discussion of this model, see 1 L. Loss &J. SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 380-
91.
126. See, e.g., Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 598, 601
(1989); Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as
an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 892 (1988).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 116-117.
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also would remove a fair amount of state derivative litigation from
jurisdictions which, from time to time, have been criticized for their
dependence on corporate franchise taxes, to jurisdictions which,
with no similar conflict of interest, could review these causes of ac-
tion in an objective manner.' 28
The design of a purely procedural approach to corporate litiga-
tion would be the most difficult drafting problem posed by these
proposals. How should Congress deal with state law standards such
as that in the Delaware General Corporation Law that permit a cor-
poration to "opt out" of duty of care liability? 129 How should it deal
with the more than purely academic possibility that states will design
new forms of takeover defense with the express intent that they are
not reviewable by any court? At some point Congress might be
forced to address the need for a substantive federal corporate law,
but we are not there now. Consistent with the general theme of
these proposals, that Congress should only act when a clear need is
shown, we would be wiser to take a "wait and see" approach.
In each of the three areas, the proposals are modest. In es-
sence, they return the law to where it appeared to be a short time
ago. This is not a federal incorporation law or a preemption of state
law as broad as Professor Cary's 1974 proposal.' 30
Revisions of the current law along the lines discussed would
have salutary effects. Each proposal would strengthen systems of
corporate monitoring or corporate accountability. There would be
a greater uniformity in corporation law and a diminution of the like-
lihood that more parochial concerns would prevail in legislative or
administrative consideration of these proposals. By limiting these
proposals, the risk of legislative overkill or of regulation that might
do more harm than good, is considerably reduced. At the very least,
we have witnessed so significant a deterioration of corporate law
standards that a policy debate whether federal minimum corporate
law standards should be adopted is now appropriate.
128. See Cary, supra note 4, at 697-98.
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988).
130. Cary, supra note 4, at 702.
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